XI BRAZILIAN CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INSURANCE

INSURANCE IN THE EIGHTIES: A SOCIAL FORCE

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It is a great honour for me to be before this Conference and to be able to expose some considerations on insurance, institution to which I have dedicated my whole professional life.

It has been many years since MAPFRE, and I personally, have realized that the body of Latinamerica represents a great political force to which we feel tied by sentimental and cultural bonds as well as by political strategies, and these bonds we want to strengthen as much as possible.

Within Latinamerica, Brazil constitutes a great country occupying a vast area of its territory and offering a special dynamismn and will towards growth and progress.

Because of that and other reasons, Brazil has been familiar to me for many years. I have tried to analyze its institutions and get as closer as possible to its people, and that is why this occasion is to me much more than the opportunity to express my points of view; it is an important milestone in both my personal and working life.

To all of you, Brazilian insurers, to all the organisms and corporative institutions which have participated in the organization of this Conference, in particular to your Federation, the Sindicate of Minas Gerais and the I.R.B. to which I have been related and have even collaborated in its Magazine for over thirty years, thank you very sincerely for the opportunity you have given me.

At this moment I wish to also dedicate a memory to that old friend and great insurer who brought the name of Brazil to every zone and market in our profession, Angelo Mario Cerne, whose friendship honoured me and to whom I want to offer a special thought. Another, not less dear to me and great friend, Raul Telles Rudge, to whom the Brazilian insurance will always be in debt for his technical knowledge

and profound humanism.

1. GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

This decade is born in moments of deep crisis, not derived from the present situations as such, but possibly from the style of civilization and way of living. The 80's will confirm if we are the witnesses of the end of a period of continuous improvement or, if simply, there has been a lack of sociological adaptation to new technologisms, to industrialization level, or to freedom possibilities unreachable a short while ago.

The huge mistakes of long-term planners are on the clear now. They could not foresee crisis as obvious as that of the energy, of the iron and steel industry and of the automobile.

Powerful groups of enterprises using the most prestigious economists and the most sophisticated electronic equipment for situation analysis, have found themselves with sudden and inimaginable surprises.

which value can then be given to the forecasts of those who only exercise futurology as a mental dialectic with scarce information, and perhaps distorted at that, and with no other alternative than the pure speculative analysis?

Even under those conditions, forecasting hypothesis are needed. The business man always has to anticipate the future so as to prepare his area of responsability to the most likely situations, ready to readapt them should a different one arise.

Under these premises, I would dare to predict the following for the next future:

a) The predominance and numerical importance of the Portuguese, Castillian, Catalan, Italian and Rumanian languages, "reciprocally comprehensible" all of them, will be accentuated. They already form the most important linguistic core of the civilized world, as Chinese, the only comparable one, has substantial limitations which, for several centuries at least, will restrict its expansion.

With reference to my own language, it is very probable that, by the end of the century, the number of Castillian-speaking people will exceed that of the English-speaking population, although the English language will augment its position as the new "frank language" of the year two thousand in the international relations and among those peoples whose language is absolutely incomprehensible to one another.

Under these conditions, can we imagine what it means the great nucleous of our latin languages and their influence in the culture, the communication among peoples and, above all, in the personal idiosincracy of their population?

- b) Latin America will maintain its line of growth, within profound internal frictions, indispensable or, at least, inevitable until a structural, social and sociological sedimentation is reached whereby the conflicts which may arise all along this century are absorbed. It will become, through its almost linguistic and religious community, a progressive and coherent force within the world set-up.
- c) Brazil will continue to expand until it will become one of the powers of the world in the XXI century with influence over the whole Latinamerican continent and acting as link with the Iberian Peninsula.

d) Spain and Portugal will see their role in the European scene increased in an important manner due to the inevitable sociological displacement towards the South and their privileged situation, organic enclave with Latinamerica through the Canaries, Madeira and Azores and with Africa with which northern territory will be socially amalgamated in the coming centuries.

Under these circumstances, is there any doubt of the important challenge presented to the Latinamerican and Iberian Peninsula countries where we have an alternative which depends on our efforts and collective will to overcome? In our hands lies one of the following orientations:

- * That the vegetative growth, difficult to be stopped, is turned into an increase of problems and decadence of autochthonous cultures infiltrated by foreign sociological attitudes or ideologies.
- * That, retaining our own identity, use the new force to augment
 the influence of criteria, ways of being and ways of life which
 have still incredible similarities in spite of the distance
 among many of our countries.

II. SOCIOECONOMICAL COMMENT

Although by the end of the sixties some serious problems had appeared, the last decade began with the belief that the unlimited development and economic structure of the western world was stronger than ever and would allow for a long-term stability in spite of recession cycles which would be easily absorbed.

This prediction was not met and the energy crisis appeared along the decade.

That crisis should be regarded as the symbol of the error of purely material

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plannings entrusted to man who believed that through his own resources he could dominate his future forever.

The first energetic crisis during 73 and 74 and the last one initiated in 79,

openathe situation of a scrawny future where suffering is still the fundamental

base of human existence and every progress has negative aspects which must be

accepted. Above all, they have demonstrated how reckless was the former optimism.

I should like to point out to you certain characteristical facts of the seventies which are important for this exposition:

- * Progressive continuity of trascendental technological contributions that have permitted to delay the logical consequences of latent problems, maintaining perhaps hopes for a longer period than it was justified, and making harder the facing of reality.
- * The loss of the reverential fear to the communist myth due to the appearance of the effects of their own policies in the Iron Curtain countries and the disappearance of the invulnerability aura of the marxist regimes. Symbol of this situation were the economic failure in Cuba, the success of the workers in Poland and, above all, the end of collectivistic experience in China, refuge of ideologists rejecting the grave errors and defects of the Russian system.
- * Reappearance of nationalistic feelings, deeper, and perhaps more devastating, than those restricted to the social class and which, in many instances, may hinder the future coordination among the great areas of the world.

- * Power of religious feelings due to the influence of popular movements trampling over any form of government however crushing, such as is reflected in so diverse cases as Iran and Poland.
- * Threat of breaking-off USA-USSR bilateral balance as the base of the worldwide politics.
- * Greater influence of zones previously ignored, the Southeast of Asia in particular which, after the Vietnam war, has acquired a vitality and perspectives totally unexpected, plus the one mentioned of Latinamerica.

As far as specific figures are concerned, in the Addenda attached as complementary to my lecture, it can be observed that Brazil has increased its wealth in a constant manner in spite of the difficulties derived from its size, demographic growth and irregularities in wealth and population distribution.

Spain, which first development has not suffered these problems, has had a higher growth than that of the industrialized countries and even that of Brazil, but its future has not so brilliant perspectives and it is difficult that the Brazilian course is surpassed again.

When analyzing the figures of reference, it has to be borne in mind that they have been translated into a common currency, the dollar, whose changes are influenced by elements foreign to the real internal situation of the country. However, I think that, even so, it is the best system to obtain a comparative picture relatively homogeneous and objective. This, adversely

affects Brazil and benefits Germany due to the strong appreciation of the mark versus the dollar. In both cases, it may lead to wrong conclusions of their own internal reality.

It seems to me that the last twenty years of this century are going to be decisive for Brazil. In that period, its enormous stock of raw materials, in spite of its scarce oil, as yet, will prepare the country for the XXI century in which, with the rest of Latinamerica will play a trascendental role in the world. On the opposite, we, Europeans, will probably face problems derived from facts which can be intuited through the data I have put before you, such as the de-acceleration of the demographic growth which, although it favours spectacular short-term increases of the rent "per capita", at long term brings out difficult ecosociological problems.

As a <u>very daring</u> hyphothesis, I would say that in the 80's the five countries involved in the figures given, would maintain growth rates similar to those of the 70's, with an upwards correction for Brazil, and downwards for Spain, and, even more so, for Germany, based on a dollar annual devaluation of six to eight percent which would give this growth a different real meaning to that of the seventies.

If this forecast is correct, Brazil should end this new decade with a GNP close to a billion dollars while Spain, will be near 900.000 million dollars. In all honesty, not even within this line of pure speculation, I dare leave in writing figures for the other countries which data is given.

To obtain the above, Brazil and Spain should set as their main economical objective the fight against inflation and dodge as best as possible the permanent cost increase of the energy. This will require continuous pre-

occupation, great dosis of imagination and, above all, the whole cooperation of the united population in each country.

This will, obviously, entail problems and social frictions. In Spain at the present moment it can be observed a better understanding of the real situation and the identification of the workers with the national objectives. From all this depends our future and this was also the reason of the success of Japan and Germany as it could be of Brazil in future years.

At all events, there is something that we will all need to overcome the difficulties and convert the above forecast into reality:

- * Sacrifice. Adequately distributed among all social classes.

 The supervision and responsability of its fairness will fall upon the government who will have to face demagogical agitations in each sector (not only from the workers) which will claim to be the only one supporting that sacrifice to the benefit of the rest.
- * Savings. Irreplaceable growth base and economic improvement—
 which means accumulated work not used in consumption but to
 increase private or public patrimony. Governments can regulate
 this as follows:

<u>Directly.</u> The socialist countries are an example, though not the only one, of creating saving with very low salaries which are neither contested nor improved in practice.

<u>Indirectly.</u> With incentives in order to favour saving, the contractual one in particular, and to sanction those expenses not socially necessary.

* Investment. By using the accumulated saving funds to create starting points so as to make profitable the existing natural wealth, especially in those countries where the same is considerable; or in order to obtain more profitability of the working capacity of its population which is the base of the increase of employment level and of the average economic level.

The economy of a country and the balance of its future and cautious development, depend on <u>savings cleverly invested</u>. It is not difficult to see its connection with insurance and the specific social responsability we, insurers, have.

Although I have not been able to prepare it for this lecture, I suggest to my Brazilian friends the study of the Japanese case in depth and the social role that Life insurance is playing in that country.

III. INSURANCE IN THE 80'S

It seems probable that, within this decade, insurance sees its institutional consideration more highly appreciated; especially if it becomes one of the long-term investment channels, in fact, of a greater social interest because it inevitably requires stability and continuity.

One must not forget that insurance has two basic functions comparable to those of a reservoir, which avoids the effect of pluviometry and needs to accumulate liquid element which will eventually give a benefit of its own.

* The <u>first</u> and direct one. To serve as regulating valve of deviations derived from occasional facts, individual or collective, so as to allow the continuity of patrimonies (individual, familiar, collective or industrial) through the payment of a budgeted fixed amount.

* The second and indirect, essential to the one above, is the substantial and progressive accumulation of funds and their cautious investment which gives it a relevant collective social role.

Since last century, insurance has been a decisive economic factor in the anglosaxon countries, United States and England and its Commonwealth in particular, and, more recently, Japan and the North of Europe. The reason is that the social function of Life insurance as propeller of the contractual saving within a system of free individual decision, has been recognized there.

This, which appeared in a natural manner in the XIX century, has been the consequence especially in Germany and, I believe, in Japan, of a responsible political thought during the last years, which results are easy to appreciate. In the addenda of my lecture I am showing some interesting figures on the evolution of insurance in Brazil and in other countries during the decade of the seventies.

- I think the following aspects are worth emphasizing:
 - * The Brazilian insurance market, as well as that of my own country, have reached a very important premium increase. In Brazil in particular total premiums have been multiplied more than six and a half times, six times in Spain, six times point three in Germany, four times in France and three times in the United States.
 - * The patrimony (assets and surplus) too has experienced an important increase, though not homogeneous, with Brazil standing out clearly with more than eight times and a half and Germany with eight times. On the contrary, Spain with five times and the United States with two times have not maintained their premium increase, which in France, however, has run parallel.

- * The concentration of insurance companies in Brazil makes it possible to line itself up with Japan where insurance groups of great power are capable of becoming important tools in giving the insurance institution a specific weight in the economic life. No doubt, this can be dangerous and, above all, questioned, as well as becoming a source of grudges, but, from a national point of view, it is worthy as long as the social importance of small entities and their powerful impact as a mighty stimulant of competition and service is recognized. One should not forget that in any country, a small company with a limited set-up is much more powerful than a big, but bureaucratic one.
- * The Brazilian insurance is in conditions to achieve by 1989 a premium volume of 15.000 million dollars and a patrimony of about 20.000 million dollars; that without taking into account the perspectives of the Social Previdence, whose scope is difficult to measure at present, especially for me.

Now then, in order to achieve these objectives, the Brazilian insurance will have to face four challenges not easy to overcome:

a) Intense improvement of its efficiency and productivity; in order to reduce its operational costs and,—eventually, to lowering the price. The figures I have handled show that this is a field susceptible of substantial steps forward and, when these are achieved, insurance will be brought to new social layers, thereby increasing its penetration and size.

b) In-depth territorial de-centralization in the insurers operations so as to bring their service closer to the clients and obtain their loyalty by making them feel they are close to those who make decisions.

With this direct relationship, the abuse, or simply, the passivity in the service to the client will be more difficult; this is more or less inevitable in the big centralized organizations, where those responsible for decision-making never really meet the clients or face their problems directly.

In this sense, the experience of the Spanish insurance in the seventies is an interesting example and this is an important and positive aspect for the small companies directly connected with a geographical area. These, at least in Spain, are unbeatable.

c) Greater diffusion of automobile insurance which in Brazil represents only 80% of fire insurance, whereas in Spain surpasses it three times.

This insurance, which demands productivity and de-centralization, augments the contact with the public and is a powerful instrument for market penetration.

For reasons-I-do not exactly know, Brazil has a smaller share in this line than the important countries of the world, a situation which, undoubtedly, will be corrected in the eighties.

d) Higher growth of the present individual life insurance with savings. This is shared by the Spanish insurance where, like in Brazil, the figures for life insurance are very modest in comparison with those of the United States or Germany.

If all this is achieved, the premiums of the Brazilian insurance should represent 2,0% of its GNP and its patrimony 2,5% of said GNP and become an important factor in its economic life and social development.

IV. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INSURERS

It is not easy that a more fundamental role in the economical and social institutional force (without the threat to disappear at the first political fluctuation) is awarded to insurers unless they become aware of their responsibility and are ready to offer to the people and to the governments a highly efficient administration and a great transparency in their operation and in the investment funds.

The insurance institution, besides being a private activity which may produce a profit to its owners and to those who work for it, is an institution basically involved in the structure of a country. Only by accepting the obligations which thereby arise, we, insurers, may achieve that essential alliance with the governments, and hold an important part in the establishing of national savings and in the distribution of its investment.

We need to act as a social force in the public interest within a frame of competition and not as a speculative body, source of wealth accumulation for restricted social sectors.

This is the great goal of the private insurance of the world. Its achievement will condition our image, our structure and our size. In a certain way, that is the modest crusade that MAPFRE, and I personally, have undertaken in our country, guided by a sense of service to the public and to our national community.

I would now like to make some comments on it:

- a) The present economic crisis presents extraordinary difficulties to the industrial sector, but on the other hand <u>strengthens</u> the insurance sector which endures it more comfortably, increasing its penetration and even its profit in moments when the industrial activity hardly survives.
- b) The situations of crisis grave as the ones affecting the world today, with changes in managerial orientations, industrial activity and technology, create a moment especially appropriate for insurers to carry out their internal institutional conversion in order to become a recognized socio-economical power, far from any ideological ups and downs.
- c) It is necessary to avoid that the comfort of shareholders and of the groups of people who participate in our enterprises, dominate their structure turning them into a sleeping elephant who, little by little, loses its strength, until they are surpassed by competitors or other social sectors offering similar services at lower costs or just with a more favourable image.

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- d) Great clarity in the managerial responsibility and in the results of the different areas of operation is essential. The primary objective for the big insurers is to avoid bureaucratic monsters whose performance lack both the possibility of individual aims and the responsibility of decision-making.
- e) It is advisable to profit from the perspective of the structural changes in economy in order to be pioneers in the answer to the new needs for "security" which are opening in very diverse fields within a country. This should work both in the protection of human life as well as in the protection of physical assets, an additional service which also helps to reinforce our institutional presence.
- f) As a secondary but important goal it should also be considered that the drive of art and culture, the promotion and impulse of sports, the contribution to the ethnic balance and other aspects where the economic power of insurance can fill gaps is frequently forgotten by the governments, but are of great importance for the quality of life within a country. I have heard of important sponsorship cases in your country which deserve maximum praise.

V. DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE

As you can observe, a major part of my exposition turns around the social importance of insurance through its participation in the capitals and savings markets.

Unfortunately, this goal faces the difficulty of creating a life insurance with savings market in countries with a high inflation level. A vicious circle is then reached, so much so that, if there is inflation, there cannot be life insurance and the absence of savings through life insurance hinders the economic balance.

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Therefore, it is not enough to express good wishes about the growth of life insurance; it is necessary to find a way, difficult and slow as it may be, through which this goal is reached.

Inflation affects both pure risk life insurance and savings life insurance.

In order to overcome the defects of inflation in risk insurance, any ingenious system of annual revaluation of premiums and capitals is valid, with an adjustment to equal the cost of the progressive premium with the years; the insurance entity must also be prepared to admit the anti-selection by increasing the capitals originally contracted.

In the case of savings insurance or combined risk and savings insurance, the solution of inflation is more difficult and its management more complicated because although its coverage can be periodically adjusted by increasing the premium, the accumulated reserve of the policy is not brought to date unless an investment rate is obtained which is higher than the inflation level.

However, I believe that in spite of the difficulties this could be overcome if emphasis is put onto the following aspects:

- a) To bestow the insurance companies with a financial and investment service, capable of obtaining the maximum profitability, which, at least in Spain, will never be equivalent to the inflation rate.

 This could be sufficient if the net financial results improve the investments which are within the reach of the normal public.
- b) To recognize the social interest of life insurance and to obtain help by means of two types of government measures:

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- * Incentives for insurers to compensate them, though only partially maybe, for the impact of inflation on their savings through protective mecanisms towards our savings contractual formulae, generator of permanent investment,
- * Permission granted to the insurance entities to invest, cautiously and without speculation, but with the necessary liberty, the reserves stipulated by these forms of insurance so as to obtain results which may reduce the devaluation of the savings entrusted to them. That is, they should not be compelled to invest at a low profitability. In Spain, this is one of our important problems.
- c) Implementation of a system with a high participation in the profits on the investment of reserves. This should be clearly informed to the policyholders, so that they, as well as the control authorities know what each insurance company is doing.
- d) Regular increases of the contract premiums, according to the inflation rate. This is a formula of monetary correction which helps to maintain the reality of the cover as per the original conditions.

I sincerely believe that, not without difficulties, but based on these ideas and on the Brazilian experience of "living with inflation", some formulae can be found which allow for a market of individual contractual life insurance including savings training which may interest insureds.

In Spain, we have encountered ourselves with this problem and in the last years it has been possible to establish a market, though modest, of life insurance with savings

which survives in spite of the difficulties. In my opinion, it will augment substantially if the government recognizes its importance and some type of incentive is granted to us.

MAPFRE VIDA, established <u>less then ten years ago</u>, has become the first insurance company in individual policies and the second if group insurance is included. Its market share is close to 20% in individual life insurance and nearly 9% group and individual insurances combined.

This has been obtained by a formulae which guarantees the insureds an ample participation in the profits of investment of the technical reserves. We are not entirely satisfied with the results and, perhaps, we have not even been totally right but we believe that our formulae, adapted to every market and situation, offers a real method for life insurance including savings.

Despite a higher inflation, Brazil has been a pioneer in discovering formula which maintain alive the individual life insurance in its market. The adjustment of premiums, pre-established in the policy by means of an annual percentage, has been an important start, the further adjustment of premiums, rents and capitals, based on the deviations of the Readjustable Bonds of the National Treasure (ORTN), or on the evolution of the "Maior Valor de Referencia" as some insurers apparently do, is undoubtedly a progressive solution which will be final and decisive when the deviations, both of the ORTN and of the "Maior Valor de Referencia" will run parallel to the monetary devaluation, with a maximum unevenness of 10%.

The figures I have been given do not permit me to determine the influence of the monetary correction in the market evolution; I do not know whether there has not been time enough for them to prove themselves or that the evolution of group life insurance has been interfering through the renewable individual insurances which have received a great impulse in-your country.

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The so-called "Previdencia Privada", supplementary system of social security in the form of capitals and income, has been presented before this Conference as a field to be occupied by insurers.

To me, the inclusion of this subject has been one of the great interesting items of this conference because it deals with the insertion of a reality which insurers have been sistematically familiar with for a long time, within an insurance portfolio.

My knowledge of this system is superficial, but, as insurer, I detect the importance of such an attractive subject which can provide a wider scope to personal insurance. in the future.

I would like to point out that, in the United States, an insurance company, the Prudential, is handling the greatest volume of pension schemes, a very diversified formulae somewhat parallel to your "Previdencia Privada".

The technical proximity between life insurance and the "Previdencia Privada" is such, that it is possible, and, no doubt, convenient, to prepare studies jointly with life insurance; I would also feel highly satisfied if Spain and Brazil could collaborate in the same so that collective offers could be presented to various governments with formula contributing to an international promotion plan for private institutions, thus favouring the saving which is susceptible to long-term investment.

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I herewith finish my lecture hoping to have caught your interest and, above all, that it can serve in some respect to orientate the future of your insurance market in a line of social responsibility and service to the public. This may sound idealistic and theoretical but I can prove that it is the best method for institutional and professional success.

Thank you very much for your attention.

INDEX OF ADDENDA

- * MACROECONOMIC DATA
- * BASIC INSURANCE FIGURES
- * GROWTHS OF THE DECADE
- * RELATIVE FIGURES
- * THE PRINCIPAL INSURANCE GROUPS

. 4	COUNTRIES	Ý E A R S										
DATA		1.968	1.969	1.970	1.971	1.972	1.973	1.974	1,975	1.976	1.977	1.978
	BRAZIL	32	37	42	49	58	80	97	111	126	146	163
,	SPAIN	26	29	37	44	54	72	89	99	102	108	161
D.	USA	871	934	981	1.061	1.168	1.302	1.407	1.526	1.696	1.889	2.112
G.N	FRANCE	122	126	142	167	178	237	. 287	313	336	397	472
	GERMANY	133	162	186	231	258	340	409	393	476	569	702
	BRAZIL	88	91	92	95	98	101	103	106	109	112	115
	SPAIN	33	33	34	34	34	35	35	36	36	36	37
POPULATION	USA	201	203	204	206	208	210	211	214	215	217	219
POPUL	FRANCE	50	50	51	51	52	52	52	53	53	53	53
	GERMANY	58	59	61	61	62	62	62	62	61	61	61

G.N.P. in US-\$ billions; POPULATION in millions.

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E E	COUNTRIES		·				YEARS		E v		. '.	
DATA	,	1.968	1.969	1.970	1.971	1.972	1.973	1.974	1.975	1.976	1.977	1.978
ļ ,,	BRAZIL	38	46	60	70	87	128	154	183	196	229	275
E	SPAIN	44	53	62	77	100	146	185	215	238	247	336
LIFE	USA	31.087	33.996	36.767	40.742	44.499	44.668	52.610	58.575	66.379	72.319	78.760
ភិគ្គ	FRANCE	878	881	1.026	1.247	1.479	1.783	2.148	2,530	2.709	3.291	3.919
Ē	GERMANY	2.225	2.656	2,961	3.825	4.528	5.882	7.095	7.246	8.764	10.974	14.121
FD (0	BRAZIL	231	234	278	309	431	589	783	954	1.130	1.311	1.558
LIFE	SPAIN	379	435	503	614	765	1.020	1.246	1.433	1.477	1.603	2.231
ON-LIF REMIUM	USA	26.026	29.224	32.867	35.715	39.317	42.480	45,152	49.967	60.813	72.397	81.690
N E	FRANCE	3.031	3.113	3.499	4.248	4.978	6.287	7.549	8,701	8.938	10.697	12.678
Zā	GERMANY	3.125	3.713	4.249	5.875	6.777	8.990	10.456	10.336	12.405	15,487	19.286
Ş	BRAZIL	269	280	338	379	518	717	937	1.137	1.326	1.540	1.833
# É	SPAIN	423	487	565	691	865	1.166	1.431	1.648	1.715	1.850	2.567
TOTAL	USA	57.113	63.220	69.634	76.457	83.816	91.148	97,762	108,542	127.192	144.716	160.450
TOTAL	FRANCE	3.909	3.994	4.525	5.945	6.457	8:070	9.697	11,231	11.647	13.988	16.597
	GERMANY	5.350	6.369	7.210	9.700	11.305	14.872	17.551	17.582	21.169	26.461	33,407
S \(\)	BRAZIL	(1) 205	217	257	262	398	525	594	: 692	798	1.053	1.718
Finn	SPAIN	724	811	913	1.091	1.303	1.735	2.188	2.539	2.563	2.686	3.345
SE	USA	258.967	266.296	284.368	312.135	346.826	363.389	366.362	408.724	465.921	524.607	594.897
A S P	FRANCE	8.742	9.030	11.751	14.141	16.459	20.524	24.958	28.084	30.804	37.096	44.317
7.0	GERMANY	12.925	15.772	17.736	23.654	26.546	35.738	43.568	46.606	58,171	73.777	96.483
8 8 8	BRAZIL	(1) 15	13	20	19	22	23	26	34	32	30	31
ANC	SPAIN	27	25	27	29	28	30	30	32	32	33	34
SURANC	USA	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1.194
INS	FRANCE	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	108	112	113	113	112	114
I N W	GERMANY	181	184	189	197	205	208	209	203	200	199	200

[.] Premiums and Patrimony in US-\$ millions; EMPLOYEES in thousands.

[.] The figure for INSURANCE NAT. PATRIMONY corresponds to the sum of Own Funds and Technical Provisions.

[.] Reinsurande and Broker Agents excluded.

⁽¹⁾Estimative.

COUNTRIES	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	POPULATION	INSURANCE PREMIUMS	ASSETS AND SURPLUS	INSURANCE EMPLOYEES
BRAZIL	414	31	581	738	107
SPAIN	521	12	506	362	26
USA	142	9	180	130	N.A.
FRANCE	287	7	324	407	N.A.
GERMANY	426	6	524	646	10

This chart shows the percentual deviation of each figure in the last ten years with data available.

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COUNTRIES		GNP "PER CAPITA" (DOLLARS)	PREMIUMS TO GNP (%)	ASSETS AND SURPLUS TO GNP (%)	ASSETS AND SURPLUS, TO PREMIUMS (%)	PREMIUMS PER EMPLOYEE (thousands of dollars)	PREMIUMS PER INHABITANT (DOLLARS)
, ppigtr	69	409	0,7	0,6	77,5	21,5	3,1
BRAZIL	78	1.412	1,1	1,1	93,7	59,1	15,9
	69	862	1,7	2,8	166,5	19,5	14,5
SPAIN	78	4.375	1,6	2,1	130,3	75,5	69,8
	69	4.609	6,8	28,5	421,2	N.A.	311,9
USA	78	9.657	7,6	28,2	370,8	134,5	733,7
	69	2.504	3,2	7,2	226,1	N.A.	79,4
FRANCE	78	8,851	3,5	9,4	267,0	145,6	311,4
GERMANY	69	2.754	3,9	9,7	247,6	34,6	107,9
	78	11.452	4,8	13,7	288,8	167,0	547,7

		1.969	•	1.979 (or 78)				
COUNTRIES	No. of Order	INSURANCE GROUPS	MARKET SHARE (%)	INSURANCE GROUPS	MARKET SHARE(%)			
	1°	ATLANTICA	11,7	SULAMERICA	14,4			
BRAZIL	2°	SULAMERICA	9,7	ATLANTICA	14,0			
	3°	INTERNACIONAL	5,6	ITAU	6,6			
		TOTAL:	27,0	TOTAL:	37,0			
	1°	UNION Y FENIX	6,3	UNION Y FENIX	4,9			
SPAIN	2°	ESTRELLA	3,6	MAPFRE	. 3,8			
	3°	BANCO VITALICIO	2,9	CATALANA	3,0			
		TOTAL:	12,8	TOTAL:	11,7			
	1°	N.A.	N.A.	PRUDENTIAL	5,3			
USA	2°	N.A.	N.A.	AETNA	4,7			
	3°	N.A.	N.A.	STATE FARM	4,2			
		TOTAL:	N.A.	TOTAL:	14,2			
	1°	N.A.	N.A.	UAP	4,3			
FRANCE	2°	N.A.	N.A.	AGF	3,6			
	3°	N.A.	N.A.	GAN	2,7			
		TOTAL:	N.A.	TOTAL:	10,6			
	1°	ALLIANZ	19,3	ALLIANZ	17,2			
GERMANY	2°	COLONIA	4,8	COLONIA	4,2			
	3°	GERLING	4,0	GERLING-	3,5			
		TOTAL:	28,1	TOTAL:	24.9			

USA data corresponds to 1.978. In 1.979 the AETNA has reached the first position over the PRUDENTIAL; but market shares corresponding to this year are unknown.